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Abstract
In this dissertation, I study how consumers influence each other in the adoption and engagement
of digital goods.
In the first essay, I study peer influence in mobile game adoption. Although peer effects are
expected to influence consumer decisions, they are difficult to identify in observational studies
due selection bias: Friends share common characteristics and behave in similar ways even without
peer effects. I use a novel approach to estimate unobserved characteristics which endogenously
drive tie formation and use the estimates to control for selection, without need for instruments.
This is the first paper to use latent space to reduce bias in peer influence estimates. I find that
peers account for 27% of mobile game adoptions, and that ignoring latent homophily would bias
the estimates by 40%, in line with previous studies. In some samples, ignoring latent homophily
can result in overestimation of social effects by over 100%.
In the second essay, I examine the effect of zero rating on consumer behavior in a social net-
work. I use Facebook data on millions of users to quantify direct, peer, and long-term effects
of zero rating, a campaign where consumers can access digital media over mobile networks for
free, on social network activities. I find that zero rating does not have the same effect on all so-
cial network activities. While the direct impact of zero rating is positive on all activities, users with
more friends on zero rating create less, consume more, and give more feedback on content. In
addition, zero rating does not have a uniform effect across consumers. Some consumers benefit
more from zero rating than others, and I show that network characteristics can help identify those
consumers whose network benefits the most from zero rating.
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People influence people. Nothing influences people more than a
recommendation from a trusted friend.
Mark Zuckerberg, CEO Facebook
1
Introduction
Advertising guru David Ogilvy (2013) once said that word of mouth was “manna from heaven,
but nobody knows how to do it on purpose.” In this dissertation, I build on existing work to
introduce two new techniques and empirical settings that help advance our understanding about
“the social consumer” and how peers influence consumers’ adoption and engagement of digital
goods.
Call this “manna” what you will – word of mouth, social influence, peer effects, peer spillovers,
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network effects – these ideas all revolve around the idea that one individual’s decision depends
not just on their own personal circumstance but also on those around them. In this dissertation, I
use the above terms synonymously to refer to the general phenomenon of individuals making de-
cisions not just based on their own characteristics but also based on the actions of those around
them.
This dissertation addresses how peers influence adoption and engagement in two new and
exciting markets. According to Nielsen, the average US consumer spends 37% of time on smart-
phones using games and social networking. This statistic is even higher abroad: 40% and 47%
in Japan and the UK respectively (Nielsen 2014). From my research, there is a big opportunity
to gain more customers and to keep them more engaged using peer influence within gaming and
social networking.
In the first essay, I explore how peers influence the adoption process of social games. In or-
der to separate social influence from shared traits between friends (“homophily”), I introduce
latent space models as an approach to impute those shared traits between friends, and use these as
covariates in a hierarchical Bayesian model. I find that controlling for latent traits dramatically de-
crease the estimated size of social influence, although social influence still accounts for a quarter
of all adoptions. The effect varies significantly from sample to sample, underscoring the need to
use multiple samples and large datasets.
In the second essay, I study how peers influence engagement in social networks. I use data
from an Internet.org campaign where Facebook is zero rated, i.e., users do not pay for data charges
when accessing Facebook, on millions of users and billions of connections. Using matching and
fixed effects regression to isolate the causal effect of social influence, I find that changing mobile
data prices has both direct and indirect effects, and have differential effects across activities and
consumers.
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Right now we spend three billion hours a week playing online
games. Some of you might be thinking, “That’s a lot of time to
spend playing games. Maybe too much time, considering how
many urgent problems we have to solve in the real world.” But
actually, according to my research at The Institute For The
Future, it’s actually the opposite is true. Three billion hours a
week is not nearly enough game play to solve the world’s most
urgent problems.
Jane McGonigal, game designer
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Peer Influence in the Adoption of Social
Games
Mobile gaming is a large industry and is relevant to consumers as well as companies. Revenues
are expected to grow to $35 billion by 2017 (Takahashi 2014). Companies are increasingly look-
ing to connect with consumers via mobile games. Coca-Cola, in partnership with gaming com-
pany Ubisoft, launched a mobile dance game to connect with teens and healthy lifestyles (Maytom
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2014). Red Bull produces its own mobile games, including one that was voted by Google as one
of the best games in 2014 (RedBull 2014).
Intuitively, mobile games spread via social networks, but there is no study to quantify the role
of peers in the adoption of mobile games.
The study of peer influence is important to marketing because social influence has the poten-
tial to affect not just mobile games but many areas of consumer decision making. McKinsey &
Company estimates that a third of all consumer spending, c. $940 billion in annual consumption
in the US and Europe alone, will be influenced by social interactions (Chui 2013). The ubiqui-
tousness of social influence in consumption decisions makes it an attractive marketing opportu-
nity for firms. As a consequence, researchers want to quantify contagion effects in a myriad of
consumer settings (Godes et al. 2005, Hartmann et al. 2008).
To be effective in social networks, marketers have to take actions in line with consumer deci-
sion making processes, not just for the individual but for the individual’s peers. The first possible
driver is social influence, where one individual influences the other. If purchase decisions are
mainly driven by social influence, then marketers need to augment their marketing strategy to tar-
get the most influential individuals in the social network or build product features that promote
peer influence (Tucker 2008, Trusov et al. 2010, Hartmann 2010, Aral & Walker 2011a). Another
possible explanation is homophily, which is the concept that people who share things in common
are more likely to be friends. Because of this, friends act in similar ways because they possess sim-
ilar traits. If homophily is the dominant force, then there are latent traits responsible for purchase.
This means marketers should uncover these traits for segmentation and targeted marketing ac-
tions (Hill et al. 2006). In order to be effective, it is important to take the right action in response
to the right force governing consumer behavior.
However, identifying peer effects is not straightforward because social influence can be con-
founded with homophily. When one friend uses a game and another installs a new game, is it
4
their latent similarity that drives adoption or is it because of peer influence?
I use latent space models to untangle homophily from social influence. First, I use the social net-
work structure to extract latent traits that govern friendship formation. Then, I use the estimated
latent space coordinates to control for homophily when estimating the effect of peer influence
on adoption. I find that homophily can inflate the effect of peer influence by 40%, and even after
controlling for homophily, peers still drive more than a quarter of all mobile game installations.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows: I discuss homophily and social influence in section
2.1, illustrating how ignoring latent traits could introduce bias in peer influence estimates, and in-
troduce latent space models. Section 2.2 covers data of games adoption in a social network. Sec-
tion 2.3 introduces the model and estimation approach. Results are in section 2.4, and I conclude
in section 2.5.
2.1 Homophily and social influence
Social influence has profound impact on many aspects of customer decision making and mar-
keting, including the adoption of new technologies (Tucker 2008, Aral et al. 2009, Aral & Walker
2011a, 2012), social network usage and adoption (Trusov et al. 2010, Aral & Walker 2011b, Ghose
& Han 2011, Katona et al. 2011), eCommerce (Stephen & Toubia 2010), new prescriptions of
pharmaceutical drugs (Manchanda et al. 2008, Nair et al. 2010, Iyengar et al. 2011), ad effec-
tiveness (Bakshy et al. 2012), group decision making (Hartmann 2010), and customer retention
(Nitzan & Libai 2011). Effect size varies by the empirical setting. For example, Hartmann (2010)
finds that 35% of customer value is attributable to peer effects while Trusov et al. (2010) found
that only 1 in 5 customers actually influence their peers.
One challenge for social social influence studies is separating latent homophily and social in-
fluence (Shalizi & Thomas 2011, Angrist 2014). Homophily, the phenomenon that “birds of a
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feather flock together,” has been widely documented in sociology and organizational behavior
(Kandel 1978, Ibarra 1992, McPherson et al. 2001, Kossinets & Watts 2009). Latent homophily
arise from correlated unobservable traits among friends (sometimes called endogenous tie for-
mation) and can inflate estimates of social influence if those latent traits also cause the outcome
of interest. This is analogous to omitted variable bias or confounding which induces correlation
between friendship and the outcome of interest. The critique is not new; Manski (1993) discusses
identification problems in endogenous social effects for linear-in-means models.
Marketing literature dealing with social influence has shed some light on how to identify so-
cial influence effects. Van den Bulte & Lilien (2001) show that marketing efforts, which is similar
among doctors who know each other in a network, can explain the pattern of new drug adoption.
Once they control for these marketing actions, they find no evidence of social influence among
doctors in adoption of a new pharmaceutical drug. Tucker (2008) suggest that not properly con-
trolling for endogenous group ties could bias peer effects by 50% in technology adoption among
employees in a firm.
In order to make use of observational data, one common attempt to separate the confounding
of homophily and social influence is to include covariates in regressions and matching (e.g., Aral
et al. 2009, Nitzan & Libai 2011, Iyengar et al. 2011). Covariates could contribute to social ties
as well as the outcome, and so controlling for them should remove bias arising from observed
homophily. In the adoption of a new instant messaging system, Aral et al. (2009) show that naive
models that do not control for covariates could bias peer effect estimates by 300-700%.
Our use of latent space to control for homophily is motivated by Shalizi & Thomas (2011)
who suggest that in order to get identification of social influence, unobserved traits that influence
tie formation must be made observable. I address this by using latent space models to infer unob-
served traits that underlie social tie formations. Latent space provides a model of tie formation in
a network by co-locating friends together and separating apart strangers in a k-dimensional space
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(Hoff et al. 2002, Hoff 2005, Krivitsky et al. 2009).
Although the approach itself is no stranger to marketing, I use latent space for a different pur-
pose than research in the past. Previous researchers focus on the distance between individuals in
latent space for community detection. Ansari et al. (2011) use latent space to model distances be-
tween managers and musicians. Braun & Bonfrer (2011) build a latent space using cellular phone
call network, to predict future calls within the network based on how far apart people are in latent
space. Instead of focusing on the distance between individuals, I focus on the coordinates of the
estimated latent space. This paper is the first to use latent space models to control for homophily
in peer influence studies.
In the next section, I will sketch a latent space model and how its coordinates control for ho-
mophily.
2.1.1 Social network model based on latent space
I begin by defining a social network by its sociomatrix A, where Aij = 1 if persons i and j are
friends and 0 otherwise. Suppose that each person has a set of observed characteristics Xi and
unobserved characteristics i; assume they are both dimension 1 for illustrative purposes. Fol-
lowing Hoff et al. (2002), I assume that the log odds of two persons being friends is linear in the
distance between them according to observed and unobserved characteristics:
P
 
Aij = 1

=
exp
 
0 + 1jXi   Xjj2 + 2ji   jj2

1+ exp
 
0 + 1jXi   Xjj2 + 2ji   jj2
 (2.1)
The latent space model assumes dyadic independence, that is, the probability of a tie between
two individuals depends only on the distance between them in the latent space. The latent charac-
teristic  is identified by the network structure and the absence of shared observed characteristics.
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For example, if two people are friends, and they look completely different according to their ob-
served characteristics, it is highly likely that they share some common latent trait that induced
their friendship.  could capture a range of unobserved characteristics, from unmeasured traits to
beliefs and preferences.
To summarize, a latent space model takes data the sociomatrix and observed characteristics,
then infers the unobserved characteristics (coordinates) which gives rise to the distances between
individuals which fit the data. I will show how leaving out unobserved characteristics will intro-
duce bias, and how the coordinates help reduce this bias.
2.1.2 Latent homophily introduces bias
If I leave out latent traits related to friendship, it could introduce bias when estimating peer ef-
fects. As an example, suppose that individuals become friends based on age (observed) and intel-
ligence (unobserved): the more similar in age and/or intelligence, the more likely two individuals
are to become friends. Now, suppose that higher age and intelligence increases the likelihood
to download a new smartphone game that improves brain activity, and that there is no social in-
fluence. Because of homophily, there will be clusters of friends who are similar in age and/or
intelligence. Since friends have similar likelihood to download the game, I would see clustering
of game downloads within the social network. If I did not control for either age or intelligence,
I might conclude that the clustering of game adoption within the social network is due to social
influence. If I was able to control for both age and intelligence, I would be able to correct for the
likelihood of app download for each individual, which would explain the clustering of downloads
among friends with similar profiles.
More formally, I assume that the outcome variable depends on its lag, peer effects, and ob-
served and latent characteristics, Xi and i (Shalizi & Thomas 2011).
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Yit = o + 1Yi;t 1 + 2
PN
j=1AijYj;t 1PN
j=1Aij
+ 3Xi + 4i + it; i = 1;    ;N (2.2)
where 1 is the effect of lagged outcome, 2 captures the effect of average lagged outcome of
connected peers, 3; 4 are the effect of observed and unobserved characteristics on the outcome
variable Yit, and it is an i.i.d. error term with mean 0. Assume I estimate the coefficients using
linear regression.
If Xi and i are observed, there is no problem since every variable on the right hand side is
observed. However, i is a latent characteristic and is unknown to the analyst. Suppose I wrongly
assume that there is no latent characteristic and estimate the following:
Y^it = 0o + 
0
1Yi;t 1 + 
0
2
PN
j=1AijYj;t 1PN
j=1Aij
+ 03Xi (2.3)
Comparing the above two equations, it should be apparent that this is an omitted variable bias
problem. The omission of i induces bias in the coefficients through its correlation with other
variables.
I formalize this by regressing i on observed right hand variables:
i = 0 + 1Yi;t 1 + 2
PN
j=1AijYj;t 1PN
j=1Aij
+ 3Xi + 1i (2.4)
Then, from omitted variable equations, I know that 02 = 2 + 24.
To summarize, bias is introduced to the social influence coefficient 2 based on the correlation
between
PN
j=1 AijYj;t 1PN
j=1 Aij
and i above and beyond its correlation with Xi. Shalizi & Thomas (2011)
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point out that current methods that use Xi (such as matching methods in Aral et al. 2009) to con-
trol for observed homophily also controls for any latent homophily to the extent that Xi and i
are correlated.
Omitted variable bias depends on two necessary conditions. The first condition is that i is
correlated to the outcome variable, given all the other variables, i.e., 4 6= 0. The second condi-
tion is that i is correlated with peer activity
PN
j=1 AijYj;t 1PN
j=1 Aij
after controlling for Xi, i.e., 2 6= 0. If
either 4 = 0 or 2 = 0, then we can just estimate using observed variables without introducing
bias.
To address omitted variable bias, Goldsmith-Pinkham & Imbens (2013) cluster the social net-
work to estimate ^i, and then using them to control for  when estimating the outcome variable,
then use the estimated latent characteristics to predict the outcome variable.
~Yit = 00o + 
00
1Yi;t 1 + 
00
2
PN
j=1AijYj;t 1PN
j=1Aij
+ 003Xi + 
00
4 ^i (2.5)
The new coefficients now depends on a new regression:
i = 
0
0 + 
0
1Yi;t 1 + 
0
2
PN
j=1AijYj;t 1PN
j=1Aij
+  03Xi + 
0
4^i + 
2
i (2.6)
So 002 = 2 +  024 and bias is reduced if j 02j < j2j, that is, if  and ^ are positively correlated.
2.1.3 Continuous latent space
One of the problems with Goldsmith-Pinkham & Imbens (2013) is that their latent variable i is
binary (Jackson 2013). A more realistic formulation is to let the latent characteristics take on con-
tinuous values. Many variables that determine network ties naturally lend themselves to contin-
uous space, such as geographic location or age. A model with continuous variables will be more
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empirically plausible as well as contain more information. Continuous variables can be reduced to
binary variables, but not vice versa, and so using continuous latent space is more flexible.
2.1.4 Estimation of latent space
There are several considerations for estimating a latent space model.
First, an important consideration is that i are not identifiable by rotation or reflection (called
procrustation). This is because friendships are determined by distances in i. If everyone in the
latent space is rotated around an axis or reflected across a plane, then their distances remain the
same, and the likelihood of friendship formation remains the same despite the rotation and/or
reflection. Also, 2 and i are no longer separately identifiable. To fix this, I procruste estimated
coordinates to some fixed set of points. The linear transformation does not affect the estimated
social influence effect 002 because the bias is determined by the correlation between the actual and
estimated latent characteristics. Since correlations are invariant to linear transformations, then the
actual fixed point I procruste to is irrelevant. This is the same reason regressing some Y on some
X gives the same fit as regressing on linear transformations of X, as long as the span of X and its
transform are the same.
Second, latent space models requires a connected graph, i.e., you can draw a path from an in-
dividual to any other individual. Suppose there are disconnected subgraphs in the social network.
Latent space models fails because it cannot identify how far those two disconnected subgraphs
should be from each other. In fact, it would try to place them as far apart as possible. With MLE,
the distance between the two subgraphs would approach infinity; under Bayesian estimation, their
distance would be highly dependent on the prior. Empirical applications of latent space constrain
the data to come from a connected graph.
Third, it is computationally intensive and used mainly on small datasets. Most use cases exam-
ine social networks with up to a few hundred actors. Braun & Bonfrer (2011) use latent dirichlet
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as a way to cluster nodes and estimate latent space on the clustered social network with about a
hundred thousand actors. Many cases of social networks contain millions of actors. To be fair,
modeling big data is a challenge to many other statistical approaches as well and I leave extend-
ing latent space models to large datasets for future research. In this paper, I take standard ap-
proaches. First, I use snowball samples, using actors at the edge of the snowball sample to esti-
mate latent space but leaving them out in the regression estimation since I have incomplete net-
work information on them. I also use multiple samples within the social network. This allows us
to quantify when controlling for homophily has the most impact on the estimated social influence
effect. I combine estimates across samples using Bayesian regression.
Finally, if one had panel data, fixed effects can be used to absorb individual latent traits that in-
duce bias. This approach can be an easier and relatively effective way to control for homophily. It
is also relatively easy computationally. However, fixed effects requires its own set of assumptions
such as the exclusion of lagged variables in the data generating process.
2.2 Data
I use data from mixi, a leading social network in Japan. The data was shared by the company us-
ing a password protected medium. User IDs were scrambled to prevent identification of users on
the platform. Other personally identifiable information were also scrambled. The data consists
of the complete social graph of all its members, a total of 600 million connections among its 22
million users in October 2010. The social network provides a platform for apps, mostly games,
like a mobile analog of Zynga for Facebook.
The dataset records the time when an individual uses and installs mobile games over seven
days. Although this is a short timeframe, if we are able to detect influence within this short time
period, then longer panel data which companies have access to would provide even more predic-
12
tive power. I use game usage and installation information from the first six days to predict mobile
game installation in the seventh day, avoiding simultaneity issues. Because adoption for individ-
ual games is low in the observation window of the data, I could limit the analysis only to games
with a large number of installations. However, this would ignore a majority of games. In order to
include information of all games, especially those in the long tail, and to focus on the installation
of games on a social network not on individual apps, I aggregate usage and installation informa-
tion across all games.* This is plausible because watching a friend play a mobile game may drive
consumers to the app market and encourage game adoption in general.
I use snowball samples from the network because current latent space approaches have sample
size limitations and I am not able to use the entire network (22 million users). Because mobile app
adoption is sparse on a single day, I sample from a seed who adopts a mobile app in day seven to
ensure that at least one actor in the network adopts, then include all actors two degrees from the
seed in the sample.† I keep only samples that contain 300 and 600 actors to simplify estimation of
latent space, for a total of 28,007 actors across 62 snowball samples. Data is summarized in Table
2.1 below.
2.3 Model and estimation
I estimate latent space coordinates from the social network, then use them as controls in a model
of social games adoption. I choose a two-step estimator over joint estimation to sidestep com-
putational complexity. Two-step estimators are known to have standard error and coverage con-
cerns; I leave this for future research as our focus is on using the approach to reduce bias.
*If I had app meta data, I would group by genre. However, apps have been anonymized.
†This resembles case-control study design where sampling is based on outcome variable(Prentice &
Pyke 1979).
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Table 2.1: Data summary statistics (62 network samples consisting of 28,007 people)
mean SD min max
% install app in day 7 0.068 0.04 0.028 0.033
Peer usage (% friends who used mobile apps in days 1-6) 0.141 0.043 0.084 0.094
Own usage (% who used mobile apps in days 1-6) 0.148 0.613 0.068 0.528
Degrees (number of friends), log 4.025 0.313 3.046 4.819
Female 0.541 0.119 0.257 0.82
Age 27.98 4.187 19.9 37.45
Number of photos, log 2.638 0.449 1.463 3.759
Number of comments, log 3.012 0.442 0.934 3.648
2.3.1 Model of latent space
I assume conditional independence of dyads so that the probability of forming a link between two
actors in the network depend only on their observed and latent traits:
P (AjX; ; ) =
Y
i 6=j
P
 
Aij = 1jXi;Xj; i; j; 

(2.7)
where X = fX1;    ;XNg are observed covariates and  = f1;    Ng are latent traits for each
individual i = 1;    ;N,  = f0; 1g is the set of parameters linking traits with friendship status.
I assume presence of dyadic ties as a function of distance in this latent space:
logit

P
 
Aij = 1jXi;Xj; i; j; 

= 0 + 1kXi   Xjk+ ki   jk (2.8)
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where 1 > 0 so that actors who are far apart have smaller chance of being friends. The model
can accommodate multiple covariates: each Xi; i can be vectors capturing k and l traits of an
individual, which means that 1 is a vector of length k. There is no coefficient on distances of 
because I cannot separately identify the coefficient from the scale of .
I use Euclidean distance although any other distance metric satisfying the triangle inequality
can also be used (e.g., cosine distance). The number of dimensions for the latent space can be
determined by BIC or other likelihood-based criteria (Krivitsky et al. 2009).
An appealing feature of latent space models is its ability to capture more complex network rela-
tionships, for example, relationships that are reciprocal and transitive. Even though the likelihood
depends on dyadic ties, the location of an individual depends not only on its direct ties but also
on how everyone else in the network is located.
I use diffuse prior distribution   MVN (;	) : (i) is MVN (0; Ik) where ;	 are hy-
perparameters to be specified by the analyst. I set  = 0;	 = 9  I to allow for a wide range of
parameter values. The R package latentnet estimates latent space models (Krivitsky & Handcock
2008, Krivitsky et al. 2009).
2.3.2 Model of social games adoption
The dependent variable of interest in this paper is whether an individual installs a mobile game
or not. This latent utility of installing a game is allowed to vary by peer usage, own usage, and
personal traits, with heterogeneous coefficients across samples:
usit = s0 + s1Peeri;t 1 + s2Mi;t 1 + s3Degi + s4Xi + s5^si + sit (2.9)
where s denotes the snowball sample, i denotes the individual, and t denotes the time pe-
riod. Peeri;t 1 =
P
j AijMj;t 1P
j Aij
is the proportion of friends who use mobile games in days 1-6, and
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Mj;t 1 = 1 if person j used mobile games in days 1-6, and 0 otherwise, Degi = log
P
j Aij is log
number of degrees, or the number of friends person i has, Xi are time-invariant covariates for
person i, namely, gender, age, log number of photos and log number of comments. Photos and
comments control for how active the person is in the social network. Although these two vari-
ables may vary over time, this is unlikely to change significantly over the observation period of a
week. ^si are k-dimensional latent space coordinates for individual i in sample s estimated from
the latent space model. Latent space coordinates are aimed at capturing unobserved covariates
which influence friendship formation (via homophily) and are associated with game downloads.
Examples of unobserved covariates might include being an early technology adopter or being in-
terested in gaming. sit are independent type I extreme value random variables. Parameters s are
the coefficients to be estimated in the model.
I formulate this as a logistic regression problem where individual i from sample s installs (Ysit =
1) if the latent utility of installing is greater than 0 at time t:
Ysit = 1 if usit > 0 (2.10)
= 0 otherwise (2.11)
I want to estimate the model across all snowball samples to increase power and to make pop-
ulation as well as sample specific statements. There are two main issues. First, I expect heteroge-
neous treatment effects across samples. Peer effects may be large for some people and small for
others. Second, estimated latent space coordinates ^ differ across snowball samples. For exam-
ple, the first dimension of latent space in snowball sample 1 might correspond to education level,
while the first dimension of latent space in snowball sample 2 might correspond to tech savviness.
Thus, I cannot simply include the latent space coordinates into a regression with the expectation
that the latent space dimensions align across samples.
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A parsimonious way to address these two issues is to impose a hierarchy when estimating the
coefficients in the model:
s =  + !s (2.12)
!s  N (0;V) (2.13)
The hierarchy allows us to make population level statements about social influence while allow-
ing sample-specific heterogeneous treatment effects, shrunk towards a set of population hyper-
parameters, as well as allowing for sample-specific latent space coordinate effects on probability
of adoption. This is important because while I might expect that homophily plays a big role in
mobile app adoption and therefore generate a large bias in social influence if ignored, the phe-
nomenon may vary by consumers in the population, so the bias may be large or small. The hierar-
chy will help uncover which groups of consumers are most affected by homophily bias and which
are not.
I place prior distributions:
  N  ;A 1  (2.14)
(V) 1  W (;V) (2.15)
where W (;V) is the Wishart distribution with  degrees of freedom and V location parame-
ter.
I estimate the model with MCMC using the Metropolis algorithm. At iteration t, I accept a
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candidate draw for each sample with probability proportional to the ratio of posterior density:
P (acceptnews ) = min
241; 

news j(t 1);V(t 1)

p

Yjnews ;X; ^




(t 1)
s j(t 1);V(t 1)

p

Yj(t 1)s ;X; ^

35 (2.16)
otherwise, keep (t)s = (t 1)s
Then, given the draws for all samples
n

(t)
s
o
, I draw parameters from distributions centered at
the weighted average of the priors and the mean and variance of these samples:
(t)  N
h
d;V(t 1)beta 
 (S+A) 1
i
(2.17)
V(t)
 1  W ( + S;V+ O) (2.18)
where (2.19)
d = (S+A) 1 (
P
s s +Ad) (2.20)
O =
P
s
 
s   (t)
  
s   (t)
0 (2.21)
S = Number of snowball samples (2.22)
(2.23)
2.3.3 Alternate models
I estimate four models for mobile app adoption. The first model is a naive model, including only
peer usage, own usage, and degrees. The second model adds covariates (gender, age, photos,
comments) but no latent space, similar to existing methods that control for observed homophily
but not latent homophily. The third model adds latent space coordinates but no covariates, re-
flecting a scenario where latent space is estimated but no variables are available to control for
observed homophily. The last model controls for both observed and latent homophily using co-
variates and latent space coordinates.
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I standardize variables and estimate the model with MCMC. The MCMC chain is run for
400,000 iterations, keeping every 5 draws. Convergence is checked visually with plots of co-
efficients after a burn in of 200,000 draws. I check model fit and choose the number of latent
space dimensions with log marginal likelihood (Chib 1995). I set  = 0;A = 0:1;  =
number of X variables + 3;V = I.
2.3.4 Model selection
I report the log marginal likelihood of different model specifications in a plot in Figure 2.1. The
full model (Model 4) with both covariates and latent space of 8 dimensions (for each sample) fits
the data best. It improves over either the covariates only model or the latent space only model
(Models 2 and 3). This suggests latent space captures an aspect of the data that is separate and
additional to observed homophily.
Figure 2.1: Logmarginal likelihood (LML) by dimensions of latent space
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Peer influence estimates
Table 2.2 shows the estimated posterior mean and 95% posterior interval for population parame-
ters across different specifications of the model. In all models, own mobile app activity from the
past six days is positively correlated with new app installation. Female consumers are more likely
to install apps than their male counterparts.
The peer activity coefficient, a measure of peer influence, is positive and significant. The pa-
rameter estimate decreases when I control for latent homophily with latent space (from Model 2
to Model 4).
As expected, the coefficients for latent space only make sense at the sample level and there-
fore are not significantly different from zero at the population level. This is because latent space
captures different aspects of latent homophily across different samples from the population. To
check the face validity of the latent space model in fitting the social network, I compare the esti-
mated latent distances between friends and non-friends in the sample. On average, non-friends
are twice the distance from each other as friends are in latent space. This supports the idea that
there is significant latent homophily in the data.
To quantify the impact of social influence, I simulate two worlds: one with social influence and
another without social influence. In the current dataset, individuals can be influenced by peers
who use mobile apps. For the world without social influence, I predict the level of mobile app
adoption when peer influence is removed.
When I remove peer influence, the average mobile app adoption likelihood falls from 6.80%
to 4.98% (under model 4). The decline of 1.82% is significantly different from zero. From these
numbers, I can attribute 1.82% / 6.80% = 27% of all mobile app installations to social influence
(95% posterior interval: [25%, 28%]).
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Table 2.2: Regression coefﬁcients estimates (Logistic regression population parameters)
Model 1: Naive 2: Covariates 3: Naive & latent 4: Covariates & latent
Intercept -4.48 (-4.82, -4.15) -4.59 (-5.05, -4.15) -4.77 (-5.07, -4.45) -5.28 (-5.67, -4.85)
Peer activity 3.21 (2.66, 3.79) 3.48 (2.89, 4.15) 2.74 (2.15, 3.23) 2.53 (2.17, 2.88)
Own activity 2.73 (2.53, 2.93) 2.76 (2.54, 2.98) 3.08 (2.83, 3.34) 3.13 (2.87, 3.40)
Degree 0.07 (-0.04, 0.18) 0.01 (-0.13, 0.16) 0.01 (-0.14, 0.15) 0.04 (-0.13, 0.21)
Female - 0.21 (0.02, 0.41) - 0.28 (0.05, 0.50)
Age - -0.01 (-0.011, 0.10) - -0.01 (-0.14, 0.13)
Photos - 0.06 (-0.05, 0.18) - 0.08 (-0.07, 0.23)
Comments - 0.02 (-0.11, 0.15) - 0.03 (-0.14, 0.19)
^1 - - 0.01 (-0.12, 0.14) -0.01 (-0.15, 0.13)
^2 - - 0.01 (-0.14, 0.12) 0.01 (-0.13, 0.15)
^3 - - 0.00 (-0.12, 0.13) 0.00 (-0.14, 0.14)
^4 - - 0.02 (-0.11, 0.15) -0.01 (-0.15, 0.13)
^5 - - -0.01 (-0.13, 0.12) 0.00 (-0.14, 0.14)
^6 - - 0.00 (-0.13, 0.13) 0.00 (-0.13, 0.14)
^7 - - 0.01 (-0.12, 0.13) -0.01 (-0.14, 0.14)
^8 - - 0.00 (-0.13, 0.12) 0.00 (-0.14, 0.14)
^9 - - 0.00 (-0.13, 0.12) -
Mean of posterior distribution, () contain 95% posterior credible interval; bold = 95%
posterior credible interval does not cover 0
Next, I plot the change in probability of adoption with and without social influence for indi-
viduals (Figure 2.2). For 5% of individuals, peers play no role at all because none of their peers
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use mobile apps. For the middle half of individuals, peer influence accounts for 23% to 43% of
the motivation for app adoptions.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of peer effects as a driver of mobile app adoption
2.4.2 Magnitude of bias from homophily
To assess the importance of accounting for latent homophily, I repeat the simulation in the previ-
ous section but use model 2 which does not control for latent homophily. With this model, I find
that social influence accounts for 38% of all installations (see figure 2.3). Thus, ignoring latent
homophily results in a 38% 27%27% = 40% inflation of social influence effects (p < 0:001, based on
posterior distributions of difference in peer effects). The size of the bias due to latent homophily
is in line with prior research which find that latent homophily can inflate social influence by 10-
50% (Tucker 2008, Hartmann 2010).
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Figure 2.3: Drivers of mobile app adoption (% of total adoptions)
Our modeling approach allows us to estimate the bias distribution across different samples
from the network. I plot the histogram of biases as a percent of effect size in Figure 2.4. This is
how much social influence is overestimated if I do not account for latent homophily. I find pos-
itive bias in every sample. On the low end, ignoring latent homophily would bias social influence
estimates by 15-20%. On the high end, the bias could inflate the effect by more than 100%. The
variability across samples could be due to sampling error or because homophily and social influ-
ence have heterogeneous effects in the network. At this point, I am not able to tease these two
effects apart.
2.5 Discussion
I study peer influence in social games. To reduce bias in our estimates, I propose using latent
space to model latent homophily and using them as controls in regressions. I apply the method to
investigate whether mobile game adoption is influenced by peers and find that peers drive more
than a quarter of all mobile game adoptions, even after controlling for homophily.
Ignoring homophily could result in extremely biased estimates. In our setting, I find that latent
homophily could inflate the proportion of adoption attributed to social influence by 40%. Alarm-
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Figure 2.4: Bias to effect size ratio in each sample
ingly, there is large variation across samples; the bias in some samples was as large as the effect
size itself. Based on our simulations and empirical findings, I conclude that it is necessary to con-
trol for latent homophily when estimating social effects. Latent space presents an appealing and
intuitive way to do so.
There are some methodological gaps for further research. The approach I use involves two
step estimation which may have implications for standard errors. I do not explore this issue be-
cause the primary focus of this paper is to address a more fundamental social science question:
whether I can detect and reduce the bias induced by latent homophily on the coefficient of social
influence using latent space.
Separating social influence from homophily continues to be a challenging area for research.
Providing bounds for the effect of social influence is of great interest to the social influence re-
search community but require additional work (Aral et al. 2009, Shalizi & Thomas 2011). If cer-
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tain assumptions are satisfied, bounds for the regression coefficients in the presence of proxy
variables can be stated (Klepper & Leamer 1984, Bollinger 2003, Bollinger & Minier 2015). Since
latent space coordinates act as proxy variables for latent traits that drive homophily, there may be
potential to provide bounds for social influence effects. I leave this for future research.
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In locations like Sub-Saharan Africa where 69% of people live
on less than $2 per day, only 53% of the population can afford
the internet with a cap of 20MB, an amount that provides just
1-2 hours of web browsing a month.
State of connectivity: 2014, Internet.org
3
The Effect of Zero Rating on Social
Network Activities
Digital media and social networks are increasingly significant parts of consumers’ lives. In a single
day at the end of 2014, 2 billion photos are shared over Facebook and Instagram, over 7 billion
likes are made on Facebook, and over 30 billion messages are sent via Whatsapp (Zuckerberg
2015). The top five largest online social networks collectively boast over 3 billion monthly active
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users (Ballve 2013). Among iOS and Android users, access of digital content accounts for 50-60%
of all time spent on a smartphone, with social networks accounting for more than a quarter of all
time spent on mobile phones (Khalaf 2014).
Yet, not everyone is online. The percentage of people who access the internet at least once
a year is around 30% in developing countries, compared to 80% in developed countries (Inter-
net.org 2015). This disparity has led to organizations such as internet.org to work on connectivity
around the world, because connecting people to the internet has significant impacts on national
economic outcomes and consumer livelihood (Qiang et al. 2009, Katz 2012, Nottebohm et al.
2012, Chhachhar et al. 2014, Meltzer 2013, Manyika et al. 2013, Trucano et al. 2012).
One of the barriers to connectivity is affordability. Only 46% of those in developing coun-
tries can afford the internet (as measured by the cost of 250MB per month), compared to 99%
in developed countries (Internet.org 2015). In response, many mobile operators, especially in de-
veloping countries, have partnered with digital media companies, including Facebook, Google,
and Wikipedia, to “zero rate” mobile data access of digital content (Bergen 2014). Under zero rat-
ing, consumers on partner mobile networks can access zero rated digital content for free. These
efforts have resulted in massive increases in mobile data adoption. For example, Globe, a large
mobile carrier in the Philippines, doubled the number of mobile data users since the introduction
of zero rated Facebook (Globe 2014). Indeed, partnering with digital media companies is a stan-
dard practice with over 45% of mobile operators engaging in zero rating globally(Morris 2014).
Another barrier to connectivity is relevance (Internet.org 2015). Globe in the Philippines iden-
tifies that “customer awareness of the value of the internet” as a barrier to adoption (Globe 2015).
On communication platforms such as Facebook, there needs to be a critical mass before the plat-
form becomes relevant for consumers. By making connectivity affordable for masses of people,
consumers may find being online more relevant since they can communicate with more peers.
Existing studies of zero rating focus on connecting unconnected consumers. A case study
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of zero rating by Telenor in Pakistan showed that not only did more people come online during
the zero rating campaign, but the campaign accelerated connectivity in the country as more and
more people came online (MEF 2015). A study by Globe in the Philippines found that zero rating
fueled growth in new subscriber acquisitions (Globe 2015). This chapter extends existing knowl-
edge about zero rating beyond unconnected users, for whom benefits to zero rating are obvious
and fairly well documented, by studying how zero rating affects connected users – those users who
are already online.
Zero rating should have multiple effects by addressing affordability and relevance of connectiv-
ity for consumers who are already connected. At the basic level, there is a direct impact of a price
change. By lowering the price of connectivity to zero, zero rating directly benefits consumers
economically and may influence their social network activities. Since peers also benefit from the
price change, then having more peers on zero rating should also influence activity levels. Finally,
since connectivity is an experience good, we expect a long term effect of zero rating, even after
the pricing regime reverts back to pre-campaign levels.
In this study, I model consumer behavior during a Facebook zero rating program to answer
three questions around zero rating partnerships. First, what is the direct effect of zero rating on
customer activities in the social network? Second, do zero rated users affect activity levels of their
peers? Finally, what are the persistent effects of zero rating after the pricing change has ended?
I contribute to the literature by quantifying the direct and spillover effects of marketing ac-
tions on social network activities across people and time. I find that zero rating does not have the
same effect on different activities. While the direct impact of zero rating is positive on all activ-
ities, users with more friends on zero rating create less, consume more, and give more feedback
on content. In addition, zero rating does not have a uniform effect across consumers. Some con-
sumers benefit more from zero rating than others, and I show that network characteristics can
help identify those consumers whose network benefits the most from zero rating.
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The paper is structured as follows: I describe the study context and relate it to extant literature
in section 3.1. I build the model in section 3.2. Results and managerial implications are in section
3.3. I conclude in section 3.4, and end with a few extensions to the current study in 3.5.
3.1 Pricing and social network activities
There is an active research agenda on how consumers influence each other. Many studies find
that peers who adopt new technologies increase the probability that their connected ties will
adopt as well (Tucker 2008, Aral et al. 2009, Aral & Walker 2011a, 2012). Studies on activities
in social network find similar patterns: higher activity individuals influence their friends to engage
in more activities as well (Trusov et al. 2010, Aral & Walker 2011b, Ghose & Han 2011, Katona
et al. 2011).
To make these research findings actionable, attention is given to how social influence interacts
with firm actions. Some studies examine peer influence changes the role of communication chan-
nels such as detailing (Manchanda et al. 2008, Nair et al. 2010), the value of product and platform
design to influence consumer chatter (Godes & Mayzlin 2009, Aral & Walker 2011a, Manchanda
et al. 2014), social advertising (Bakshy et al. 2012), or pricing in group settings (Hartmann 2010).
Understanding how managers can influence social network engagement is important because so-
cial networking is an increasingly important aspect of how consumers spend their time. There is
also evidence that increased engagement is associated with higher consumer well-being (Burke
et al. 2010). Understanding activity levels can also shed light on the evolution of social capital
within a network (Shriver et al. 2013). Finally, different social network activities vary in their im-
pact on business outcomes like adoption and product virality (Aral & Walker 2011a). Therefore,
understanding how to influence one activity over another is critical to marketers in general.
Marketers are familiar with the relationship between prices changes and sales in traditional
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settings (e.g., Gupta 1988, Bell et al. 1999, Jedidi et al. 1999). In the past two decades, extensive
research has documented not just how price changes affect the product in the offer but spillover
to related products (Van Heerde et al. 2003, Leeflang & Parreño-Selva 2012) as well as long run
effects (Mela et al. 1997, Nijs et al. 2001, Pauwels et al. 2002). Although higher peer activities
increase activity level (Trusov et al. 2010), certain activities may benefit more from a price change
than others.
To my knowledge, there is the first study on how pricing and peer effects affect social network
activities, and on long-term peer effects.
3.1.1 Study context
Internet.org, a global partnership with the goal of making internet access available to the next
5 billion people, introduced a partnership between Facebook, the largest social network in the
world, and a mobile operator, second largest operator in a duopoly in a large country, to zero rate
access to Facebook *. A nationwide marketing campaign ensured high awareness of zero rated
pricing; post-campaign offline surveys confirmed this finding. When mobile subscribers of this
partner opted into zero rating, all data access charges incurred by using Facebook are waived. Ev-
eryone is eligible to opt into zero rating by logging in to Facebook on the partner mobile network
and clicking on a box agreeing to terms of service. As with any marketing campaign where some
consumers find the offer attractive or not, some users did not opt into zero rating. Most con-
sumers are on pre-paid mobile plans and few use mobile data during the time of the campaign.
Our dataset begins several months before the campaign launch date. Before the campaign
launched, users pay for access to Facebook over the mobile carrier’s network. The campaign
lasted for several months, during which time users who opt-in to the zero rating campaign re-
ceive free unlimited mobile bandwidth when accessing Facebook. For these users, mobile data
*Some details of the campaign have been redacted for confidentiality
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to use Facebook, such as creating content such as posting status updates and uploading photos,
consuming content by reading stories, and giving feedback via comments or likes, are free on the
partner mobile carrier network. After the campaign, data charges for accessing Facebook revert to
the pre-campaign price (see Figure 3.1). Users who do not opt in pay for data associated with all
their activities throughout the entire observed time period.
Figure 3.1: Data timeline of zero rating campaign and pricing
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The analysis includes only existing Facebook users because although zero rating resulted in
significant new user growth, new users are an obvious win for all parties involved and is fairly
straightforward to count. Complexity arises from those who were already Facebook users and
may change their social networking activities in response to price changes, or their friends’ access
to free data. I keep users who had at least one activity in the first month of the data period be-
fore zero rating, and use the remainder of the data before zero rating to establish a baseline for
what would have happened if there were no campaign. Therefore, this analysis is conservative
in estimating the benefits to consumers because new to Facebook consumers are excluded from
analysis.
3.1.2 Social network activities
Not all social networking activities are created equal; they play different roles and have different
impact on consumer and company well-being. Since they play different roles in relationships in a
social network, I expect zero rating to have different effects on each activity type.
On social networks, people can create, consume, or give feedback on content. Lurkers, users
who consume but do not create content, have been a major concern for user-generated content
platforms (Hughes et al. 2005). Content consumption without creation induces three issues. First,
if not much content is being created, then the platform becomes less compelling for other users.
Content engages other consumers to be active on the social network platform (Zhang & Sarvary
2011). To combat this freeriding issue, Burke et al. (2009) find that feedback encourages users to
create more content. Second, research into user well-being finds that content consumption is cor-
related with decreased social capital and increased loneliness (Burke et al. 2010). Finally, although
one might assume that online activities are positively correlated, these social networking activities
actually compete for the user’s time. After controlling for individual characteristics, Ghose & Han
(2011) find that content creation is negatively correlated with consumption.
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Zero rating may have a direct effect of increasing content creation, consumption, and feed-
back, since they are all free with the mobile operator. Having peers with zero rating could impact
these activities differently. Since peers create more content under zero rating, then an individ-
ual’s newsfeed potentially has more interesting content, so peer zero rating should increase con-
sumption and feedback. Peer zero rating could increase or decrease individual content creation.
Although increased peer feedback and peer consumption of content might also motivate higher
content creation, consumers may also decrease their activity if they spend more time consuming
content or if they feel that their peers have generated sufficiently interesting content (and there-
fore they do not have to bear the burden of creating content themselves). On the other hand,
seeing their peers create content also set norms of content creation and spur higher activity levels
as well. In essence, individuals may view more content but it is unclear whether content creation
will increase in the network or not.
After zero rating, those who opt in start paying for mobile data if they continue using it. Ha-
bituation might suggest that individuals who had higher levels of activity might continue having
using Facebook more. Zero rating may also improve brand positioning in consumers’ mindset.
However, if they also adjust their reference point during the campaign, then suffering the loss
of zero rating, or the loss of peer zero rating, could result in lower activity levels than before the
campaign period (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). Therefore, we might see either higher or lower
levels after the campaign.
3.2 A model of social network activities
I model each measure of activity level (stories, feedback, and content) as a function of whether
the individual has or had zero rating and whether their peers have or had zero rating.
I start with an ego-centric network where N(i) is individual i’s neighborhood, the set of users
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Figure 3.2: Average daily activity per person: Opt-in curve includes anyonewho opted into zero rating at any point during
the campaign; normalized so non-opt in is 1.0 at the beginning of the data period
who are directly connected to individual i, i.e., her friends. Although a consumer’s Facebook net-
work is dynamic, I take a static view because tie-formation is not the focus of the study. Let zero
rating start at time T0 and end at time T1. Before the campaign (t = 1;    ;T0   1), I model digi-
tal media activity Y by individual i at time t as a function of individual-level (i) and time (t) fixed
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effects:
Yit = i + t + it; t < T0 (3.1)
with idiosyncratic error terms it (Angrist & Pischke 2008). To control for individual differences
across consumers, I take the average activity level pre-campaign for each individual:
Yprei =
1
T0 1
PT0 1
t=1 Yit; t < T0 (3.2)
= i +
1
T0 1
PT0 1
t=1 (t + it) (3.3)
= i + 
pre + 
pre
i (3.4)
During the campaign (from T0 to T1), individuals can opt into zero rating. I denote the time
that an individual i opts in by i and end of zero rating for that individual as i. If the individual
does not opt into zero rating, then i = i = 1. Define Zit  I(t  i; t  i), which equals 1
if individual i has zero rating at time t. I address endogeneity and propose fixed effects regression
with matching to combat self-selection issues in the next section.
During the campaign, i.e., T0  t  T1, I model activities as a function of fixed effects as
before and add individual and peer zero rating status:
Yit = i + t + 1Zit + 1
P
j2N(i) Zjt + 1Zit 
P
j2N(i) Zjt + it (3.5)
where 1 is the direct average treatment effect of an individual having zero rating, 1 is the incre-
mental indirect or peer effect of each peer that opts into zero rating, and 1 is the effect of inter-
action between peer and individual zero rating statuses. Even though an individual’s activity level
could be affected by peers’ zero rating status via peers’ activity level, adding peer activity levels
would introduce issues of simultaneity. I abstract away from this issue by letting the treatment be
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individual and peer zero rating status, thereby getting an intention-to-treat (ITT) estimate of zero
rating.
After the campaign ends, define Zhadit  I(i  t; i < t) = I(i < t) which equals 1 for those
who had but lost zero rating. For t > T1, I get:
Yit =i + t + 2Zhadit + 2
X
j2N(i)
Zhadjt + it (3.6)
2; 2 are the long run effects of having had zero rating or having peers who had zero rating.
I account for individual fixed effects by subtracting the pre-campaign average activity level
from observed activity levels during and after the campaign. During the campaign, I get:
Yit =t + 1Zit + 1
X
j2N(i)
Zjt + 1Zit 
X
j2N(i)
Zjt + 0it (3.7)
where Yit = Yit   Yprei , t = t   pre, and 0it = it   prei . Post-campaign, I get:
Yit =t + 2Zhadit + 2
X
j2N(i)
Zhadjt + 
0
it (3.8)
We estimate three models in this paper. Equations 3.7 and 3.8 form our basic fixed effects re-
gression model (Model 1). I take daily average activity for each week. Since opt-in need not occur
at the beginning of the week, to be conservative I consider that an individual had zero rating that
week if they had at least one day of zero rating. I regress average daily activity each week against
dummy week variables and covariates using linear regression. Because I observe many weeks per
person, clustered standard errors for necessary for inference. However, analytic calculation is pro-
hibitive due to data size (in the hundreds of millions person-week observations). Instead, I use
bootstrap to calculate robust standard errors for clustered data (Efron 1981, Efron & Tibshirani
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1986). I winsorize the data at the 95th percentile to avoid outliers.
For model 2, I control for the number of friends (degree) and pre-campaign activity level as
covariates in addition to using pre-campaign activity in the fixed effects regression (Equations 3.9
and 3.10). Model 2 during the campaign:
Yit =t + 1Zit + 1
X
j2N(i)
Zjt + 1Zit 
X
j2N(i)
Zjt + 1Xi + 0it (3.9)
where Xi are degree and pre-campaign activity level.
Model 2 after the campaign:
Yit =t + 2Zhadit + 2
X
j2N(i)
Zhadjt + 2Xi + 
0
it (3.10)
The inclusion of these covariates allows for a baseline change in difference in Y to interact with
covariate terms (and thus it does not get absorbed by the individual fixed effect).
For model 3, I allow for heterogeneity in the dataset by dividing the data into nine subclasses:
three subclasses by degree crossed with three subclasses by pre-campaign activity level, at the 33rd
and 67th percentile. I then estimate the fixed effects regression with degree and pre-campaign
activity as covariates for each subclass. This allows for all coefficients, including fixed effects, to
vary by subclass.
3.2.1 Endogeneity
One issue is that opt-in is endogenously chosen by the consumer. I expect that opting into zero
rating is mainly driven with two factors. First, those who use Facebook more benefit more from
the reduced price, and therefore are more likely to sign up for zero rating. Second, those with
more friends also benefit more from Facebook, so are more likely to sign up for zero rating.
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Another issue is that omitted variables can induce spurious correlations through homophily.
For example, young people may be more likely to be connected to each other, more likely to
opt into zero rating, and also more likely to increase activity over time. Shalizi & Thomas (2011)
demonstrate that even simple models of homophily, where ties are more likely between similar
individuals, can bias social influence estimates when tie-forming traits are unobserved and un-
controlled for in the model. Researchers have several strategies to control for homophily bias in
observational studies (for a review, see Angrist 2014), including post-stratification and matching
(Aral et al. 2009, Eckles & Bakshy 2015) and fixed effects regression(Bramoullé et al. 2009, Nair
et al. 2010).
I employ both matching and fixed effects regression to address these issues. Individual and
weekly fixed effects address unobserved individual traits and time trends, but there may be other
unobserved variables which vary by both consumer and time, for example, local marketing activ-
ities. Post-stratification based on degree and pre-campaign activity level takes care of unobserved
variables that vary by subclass, for example marketing activities that could affect active users dif-
ferently than less active ones. The balance improves significantly after matching (Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.4 shows the average daily activity for stories viewed per person, for those who opt
in and those who did not. By matching on pre-campaign activity, using those who did not opt
in as a control group seems more plausible. We also see distinctly different treatment effects by
subclasses.
3.3 Results
Based on estimated model coefficients of model 3 (full coefficients are redacted for confiden-
tiality), I estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) by taking the difference in Y^
when zero rated individuals get zero rating and when zero rated individuals do not get zero rating.
38
Before matching
After matching
Not zero rated
Zero rated
0
100
200
300
400
250 500 750
degree
pr
e_
ac
tiv
ity
FB Stories: Covariate balance before and after matching
Figure 3.3: Covariate balance (average degree and pre-campaign activity level) before and after matching (FB stories
example). Beforematching, the circle and triangle represents average degree and pre-campaign activity for zero rated
and non-zero rated individuals respectively. After matching, there are nine subclasses, so there are nine pairs of statistics.
Scale redacted for conﬁdentiality.
Estimated percentage changes averaged across subclasses are found in Table 3.1.
I find that zero rating increases content consumption. The direct impact of zero rating is a
14% increase in stories viewed per day on average. In addition to the direct impact of zero rating,
zero rated peers induce an increase in content consumption, resulting in a total lift of 37% in
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Figure 3.4: Average daily stories viewed per person by subclass: Opt-in curve includes anyonewho opted into zero rating
at any point during the campaign; normalized so non-opt in is 1.0 at the beginning of the data period
content consumption from pre-campaign levels (even after controlling for time effects).
After the campaign, having had zero rating still results in higher content consumption, but
peers losing zero rating reduces the number of stories viewed. As a consequence, total lift after
the campaign ends is lower, we find significant positive lift of 5.6% above pre-campaign levels.
Zero rating also increased feedback but peer effects are even more pronounced, and remain
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Table 3.1: Effect of zero rating on zero rated and non-zero rated users, as percent of pre-campaign activity level (Bold:
95% conﬁdence interval in parentheses does not cover 0)
Per zero rated user Stories Feedback Content
During campaign
Zero rating 14.0 (13.7, 14.2) 1.0 (0.7, 1.3) 7.9 (7.6, 8.2)
Peer zero rating 22.5 (21.7, 23.2) 78.8 (78.1, 79.3) -7.0 (-7.5, -6.4)
Total effect 36.5 (35.4, 37.4) 79.8 (78.8, 80.6) 0.93 (0.13, 1.81)
After campaign
Zero rating 12.0 (11.8, 12.1) 17.1 (16.6, 17.4) 9.6 (9.2, 9.9)
Peer zero rating -6.4 (-7.3, -5.7) 33.7 (32.6, 34.5) -27.3 (-27.9, -26.6)
Total effect 5.6 (4.5, 6.4) 50.8 (49.2, 51.9) -17.6 (-18.6, -16.7)
Per non-zero rated user Stories Feedback Content
During campaign
Peer zero rating 4.1 (3.5, 4.6) 26.2 (25.8, 26.5) -12.5 (-12.9, -11.9)
After campaign
Peer zero rating -5.6 (-6.3, -5.1) 19.8 (19.1, 20.3) -23.2 (-23.6, -22.8)
positive even after the end of the campaign. Feedback increases by 80% and 51% during and after
the campaign respectively.
I find that zero rating does not increase content creation uniformly. While the direct impact
of zero rating on content creation is positive, both during and after the campaign, peers having
zero rating reduce the amount of content being created. This may be due to a number of possible
reasons, such as satiation to increased content generated by peers. During the campaign, the net
effect is still positive (0.9% increase in content on average), but after the campaign, when peers
lose zero rating, the total change is negative (-18% decrease from pre-campaign levels).
Zero rating has direct impact on those who opt in, but also affect their friends due to peer
spillover effects. Non-zero rated users increase their content consumption during the campaign,
and decrease after their zero rated peers lose zero rating. Feedback increases dramatically both
during and after the campaign (26.2% and 19.8% respectively). Content creation goes down
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among those who do not have zero rating.
The analysis suggests a few takeaways for managers. First, to summarize, zero rating does not
have a uniform impact on consumers. Clearly, consumers benefit economically. They also benefit
socially with increased interactions with content shared by friends. However, this does not mean
they increase all activities on social network. While content consumption and feedback go up for
all consumers on average, content creation goes up for zero rated individuals, but not for non-
zero rated individuals.
Second, a significant proportion of the effect of zero rating is manifest through peer interac-
tions. To conduct an analysis only on those who received zero rating while keeping those who did
not receive zero rating separate would be erroneous, because the latter group is indirectly affected
by the campaign. Further, to consider benefits to consumers who opt into zero rating only is to
paint a partial picture of the benefits of zero rating to existing customers. Those who do not opt
into zero rating also benefit, based on their peers increased activities online.
Third, ending a zero rating campaign should be done with care, since activities decline after
the end of a campaign. Thus, this suggests that zero rating, once started, should be continued to
avoid activity decline.
Fourth, zero rating has different value to different consumers. Consumers have heterogeneous
response to zero rating, and are affected by their friends in different ways. The subclass-level
coefficients, coupled with network structure and the characteristics of peers, allows deeper under-
standing of how the value of zero rating varies across the population.
3.3.1 Heterogeneous consumer response to zero rating
In our model, I estimate separate regressions and get different sets of coefficients for each sub-
class. Comparing the effects of zero rating and peer zero rating across subclasses, I find signifi-
cant heterogeneity among the user base (Figure 3.5). For example, the effect of zero rating on the
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daily stories appear to be higher for those with higher degree and pre-campaign activity level.
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Figure 3.5: Signiﬁcant heterogeneity in post-stratiﬁed estimates by subclass (FB stories coefﬁcients example); Scale
redacted for conﬁdentiality.
This supports our modeling choice to post-stratify by degree and pre-campaign activity. We dig
into this further by comparing the value to consumers for different groups in the population. An
individual might generate more spillover if they have more friends and if their friends are more
responsive to peer effects. I simulate the impact of giving zero rating to each individual, taking
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into account their response to zero rating, number of friends, and their friends’ response to peer
zero rating. The simulation uses individual-level data and subclass-level coefficients to derive an
estimate of the causal change in activity level by zero rating each individual.
I compare the population average to top decile based on degree and based on network char-
acteristics (degree and what bucket of consumers the friends fall into) (Table 3.2). The network
of consumers that benefit the most from zero rating increase their activity significantly more than
the population on average. They view twice as many stories, and give three times as many feed-
back compared to the population average due to zero rating. They also create 130% more content
as a consequence of zero rating. A consumer’s network characteristics identify consumer needs
better than just using degree as measured across all social network activities.
Table 3.2: Heterogeneity in network sensitivity to zero rating: Percent lift in activity over population average
Activity Top decile by degree Top decile by network
Stories 93% 104%
Feedback 183% 195%
Content 126% 133%
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine direct and spillover effects of zero rating. I find that zero rating increases
content consumption, feedback, and creation among those who signed up for zero rating. I find
significant spillover to peers and to the period after the end of the campaign. Peers make up a
significant proportion of the total campaign effect, in part due to the large number of people who
did not get zero rating pricing but were affected indirectly through their social circle.
My work provides an insight that zero rating programs do not have a uniform effect across all
zero rated activities, can affect consumers not on zero rating (if their peers are on zero rating),
and have implications on consumer behavior after the program ends.
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My approach uncovers variability in consumer response to zero rating. Differences in response
can be attributed to consumers’ characteristics, past behavior, and their friendship network. Zero
rating, as one of many products targeting connectivity for consumers in developing countries,
help solve problems for some consumers better than for others. We find network characteristics
to be a better indicator of consumer needs than degree alone.
One limitation is that my approach is that I exclude new consumers who come online because
of zero rating itself. Thus, the results are conservative and conclusions apply only to existing
users.
This analysis on activities on Facebook covered by zero rating. To understand the financial
implications of zero rating for mobile operators, related data of mobile phone and app use would
provide a fuller picture of how zero rating affects consumer communication activities. My analysis
benefits from including the Facebook network, but supplementing this with phone calling and
SMS network could help capture a more complete social influence process.
3.5 Further extensions
In this section, I discuss four potential extensions to the analysis in this chapter.
3.5.1 Improved matching
In the analysis, I matched using degree and pre-campaign activity level. Matching by additional
variables could improve control for self-selection and homophily. Other matching variables could
include demographics, geographic location, and time since joining Facebook. Another potential
variable is birthday, which could cause someone to self-select into zero rating and be more active.
The current matching scheme splits the dataset into subclasses. This approach becomes pro-
hibitive with a large set of variables. In response, we could use a dynamic propensity score match-
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ing approach (Aral et al. 2009). One limitation to propensity score matching is that it only con-
siders a single binary treatment. Here, we have two dimensions of treatment: ego zero rating sta-
tus, which is binary, and number of peers with zero rating, which is continuous. Instead of using
propensity score matching, we can use propensity function which accommodates continuous as
well as multivariate treatments (Imai & Van Dyk 2004).
To illustrate the modeling approach, consider two treatments: Z1 2 f0; 1g;Z2  0. Let M
be matching variables and Y be the outcome of interest. First, predict Z1;Z2 based on M to get
predicted values Z^1; Z^2. Next, subclassify similar values of Z^1; Z^2. Finally, estimate E(YjZ1;Z2)
within each subclass.
Since we observe many observations per individual, we conduct the analysis at the week level.
For each week, a consumer will have a (1) subclass based on propensity score, (2) treatment sta-
tus, and (3) outcome variable (change in activity level). Standard errors for the whole process
(including uncertainty around propensity score matching) can be estimated using bootstrap.
3.5.2 Deeper content analysis
There is an opportunity to gain greater consumer insight beyond those contained in this paper
by examining what type of content is affected by zero rating. In my analysis, I used the number
of activities as a measure of each activity type. For example, content consumption is measured
by the number of stories viewed. I can break this down further to understand which sub-types of
activities are affected.
For example, content creation can be broken down into status updates, link sharing, or photo
uploads (among others). Because these activities differ in data cost, zero rating should have dif-
ferent effects across the activities. Understanding the effect of zero rating on different content
creation activities for consumers can give better insight into consumer needs.
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3.5.3 Combined measure of network activities
Instead of measures corresponding to each social network activity, we can aggregate them into a
single metric. For example, we could index a network’s content consumption and creation.
Let Sit;Cit be the number of stories consumed and content created by person i at time t. Then,
an index Rit = CitSit measures the number of content created for every story consumed. A high R
means the person creates more content than consumed (relative to average), and a low R means
the person is more of a lurker.
We can take this measure to the network level by considering the ratio RN(i);t =
P
j2N(i) CitP
j2N(i) Sit
where N(i) is a network of person i, and j 2 N(i) means person j is a friend of i. Thus, we can
compare two different networks N1;N2 and see the ratio of content created to stories consumed
in those networks.
We can also measure how zero rating affects this index for individuals over time. Understand-
ing which consumers are affected by zero rating to become more content active or content in-
active relative to content consumption can help give product ideas to customize to fit consumer
needs.
3.5.4 Extended model of peer influence
In my model, activity level is modeled as a function of a consumer’s zero rating status and peer
zero rating. Realistically, peer activity level could enter into consumers’ decision making. I ex-
cluded this in the current analysis due to simultaneity and reverse casuality issues but discuss it
here for exploratory purposes.
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I sketch a vector autoregressive (VAR) model at the individual level, by modifying equation 3.9:
Zit =max(Zi;t 1; f(Yit;Yjt))
Yit =t + 1Zit + 1
X
j2N(i)
Zjt + 1Zit 
X
j2N(i)
Zjt + 
X
j2N(i)
Yjt + 1Xi + 0it
(3.11)
where f maps continuous variables to C(0; 1) (e.g., probit function). In the first equation, we di-
rectly model the choice of the consumer to opt into zero rating or not. We let this choice depend
on their change in activity level and peer activity level. In the second equation of 3.11, we letYit
be a function of Yjt. This reflects that peer activity may have additional effects on consumer be-
havior above and beyond peer zero rating. Y can be a multidimensional vector to reflect the in-
terdependence of activities, for example, own stories viewed depends on how much content is
created by peers. We pool across all individuals and use OLS to estimate coefficients, then get
standard errors using bootstrap. Impulse response function can be used to derive the impact of
zero rating on activities.
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4
Conclusion
In this dissertation, I study how consumers influence each other in two different digital settings
with implications for businesses and regulators. There are a few takeaways from the dissertation.
First, peer influence plays a large role in consumer decision making. Peer influence accounts
for a large proportion of adoption of social games. Yet, consumers may respond to peers by be-
ing more or less active in a social network. The implications for managers is that it is important
to understand how peers influence each other because it is a big component of marketing and
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consumer decision making.
Second, it is critical for causal inference methods to be able to accommodate Big Data and dis-
tributed computing. In the second essay, every analytic step from data processing to subclass
matching, regression and simulation was performed in Hive and Presto. Many statistical ap-
proaches, such as latent space models in the first essay, and marketing models are implemented in
statistical software that was created to accommodate sampled data. As companies acquire larger
datasets and rely more on A-B testing to inform tactical direction, what is the role of causal infer-
ence and observational studies on marketing strategy? The ability to take on Big Data and utilize
new technologies of distributed computing is a must for research to stay relevant.
Third, observational social influence studies still need further validation with gold standard
methods such as randomized experiments. There are many critiques, from Shalizi & Thomas
(2011) and Angrist (2014), which highlight difficulties in identifying social effects. Understanding
peer influence especially in digital social networks where randomized experiments may be possible
would be a positive first step.
Fourth, for managers who have already bought into the idea of social influence, the next ques-
tion is how the effect varies from individual to individual. While there are studies that examine
the question of heterogeneous treatment effects (Trusov et al. 2010), there is opportunity for
more studies to quantify how social influence varies across consumers.
Finally, understanding drivers of consumer decision making and the effect of pricing in a so-
cial network are just first steps. Managers are interested in linking marketing levers they control
with financial outcomes. For example, how do free and freemium app experience affect social
activities? How do distribution channels change the impact of peer influence in adoption?
To conclude, there is a rich research agenda to develop for how we understand consumers
and influence each other, with important practical and research implications for businesses and
regulators alike.
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